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Abstract:  
Empirical evidence questions the unitary allocation model of the household that 
underpins the standard measurement of monetary poverty and inequality. Intra-
household gender discrimination has been widely shown to shape expenditure 
decisions, nutrition status, and human capital accumulation of household members. 
However, conventional poverty and inequality analyses are conducted for the 
household as a whole, which might lead to different conclusions compared with 
studies based on individuals. Using recent developments in intra-household 
bargaining modelling, this paper constructs non-cooperative allocation rules 
dominated by gender discrimination among household members. Estimates for Chile 
show a substantial worsening of poverty and inequality under such allocation rules. 
This suggests that intra-household discrimination deserves some of the attention 
typically directed to extra-household discrimination in labour markets, access to 
public services or political participation.    
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The Distributive Consequences of Machismo: A Simulation Analysis 
of Intra-household Discrimination 
 
1. Introduction 
Gender relations, power struggles, empowerment and participation are all key issues 
in today’s socioeconomic development. At the household level, intra-household 
economics have long shown the limitations of the benevolent dictator paradigm to 
characterize decision-making within the household (Haddad et al., 1997). A host of 
empirical studies clearly show that welfare of individual members depends 
significantly on who controls earned and transferred incomes (Thomas, 1994; Doss, 
1996). Studies taking advantage of the special design of social programmes (close to a 
controlled natural experiment) show that household expenditure on children’s food 
and human capital increases when benefits are targeted directly to women. This 
evidence holds for contexts as different as the UK and Mexico (Lundberg et al., 1997; 
Coady and Skoufias, 2004). At a broader level, international financial institutions 
have started to claim that the poverty reduction and debt relief initiatives that they 
sponsor foster participation, protection and empowerment of specific vulnerable 
groups such as women or children (World Bank, 2000).    
 Despite the increasing interest, however, the workings of intra-household 
relations remain a ‘black box’ (Pahl, 1989). By concentrating on testing against the 
unitary model, the intra-household literature has overlooked a critical question: what 
impact do bargaining relations have on poverty and inequality? This paper tackles this 
question by simulating income distributions that result from incorporating gender 
discrimination in the intra-household allocation of resources. Acknowledging the 
multidimensionality of poverty,  Section 2 summarizes existing anthropological, 
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sociological and economic evidence suggesting intra-household bargaining, which is 
then used in Section 3 to construct alternative non-cooperative allocation rules within 
the household. Among these rules, different forms of gender discrimination among 
household members are articulated into what could be interpreted as machismo rules.  
Section 4 re-estimates monetary poverty and inequality indicators for Chile after 
household incomes are reallocated according to the simulated bargaining rules.  
Impacts are intended to isolate primarily the immediate effects of interpersonal gender 
discrimination, machismo, within the household, which means that neither second-
round effects nor the effects of gender discrimination outside the household are 
explicitly factored in.  By wrongly assuming cooperation within non-cooperative 
households, Section 5 concludes, policy makers might incur in gross mistakes 
regarding the impact of their interventions on individuals.   
  
2. Modelling Bargaining Behaviour 
The unitary household model (as in Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974), which underlies 
the standard measurement of monetary poverty, assumes that resources generated by 
household members in the factor markets or transferred by the State are re-allocated 
according to each individual’s needs. The so-called ‘common pool’ hypothesis of a 
benevolent dictator underpins the dynamics of intra-household allocation under the 
classic standard consumer theory. Under the unitary model, the household optimizes 
— for all its members — a combination of leisure and consumption goods, subject to 
budget constraints. However, empirical evidence increasingly points away from such 
an allocation, suggesting instead the presence of bargaining behaviour within the 
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household.1 Importantly, the intra-household bargaining hypothesis may have 
substantive welfare implications if the ability of a given member to control household 
incomes (and to discriminate among other household members in that re-allocation) is 
sufficient to alter the original distribution of incomes resulting from factor markets 
and public and private transfers. In effect, using evidence reported for Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) show that 
exogenous factors including spouses’ pre-marriage assets and their education level 
affect household outcomes such as individual shares in food, education, health, child’s 
clothing, and tobacco and alcohol. Similarly, Thomas (1994) shows for Brazil, Ghana 
and the US that children’s nutritional status depends on the household head’s gender 
and education levels. Lundberg et al. (1997), for the UK, and Coady and Skoufias 
(2004), for Mexico, show that policy shifts making women recipients of social 
benefits have a positive effect on the educational and health status of children in the 
benefiting households. For Chile, Cuesta (2005) shows the distinctive impacts of cash 
and in-kind social transfers on the supply of labour across household members. 
Although an unambiguous conclusion in favour of an endogenous pattern of 
bargaining remains elusive, the map of distributive effects from social transfers is 
inconsistent with unitary models. Contrary to the predictions of unitary models 
(Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974), the source and nature of resources brought to the 
household does matter in the decisions of individual household members. 
 Anthropological and sociological evidence has also questioned the pooled 
income hypothesis underlying the unitary model both in developed (Blumberg and 
Coleman, 1989) and developing countries (Blumberg, 1988; Jejeebhoy, 1995). 
                                                 
1 See Strauss and Thomas (1995); Doss (1996); Behrman (1997); Haddad et al. (1997); and 
Quisumbing (2003) for reviews on bargaining studies.  
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Asymmetric balance of power within the household is reflected by gender 
differentials in consumption patterns (Pahl, 1989), domestic violence (Rao, 1997), 
fertility decisions and participation in social activities (Casique, 2000). A feature of 
resource allocation in countries like India, Mexico, Cameroon or Honduras is that 
resources earned by women from activities such as weaving, home production, street 
vending, small and medium agro-business, are all contributed to household incomes, 
while men withhold a substantial part of their incomes (between 25% and 30%) for 
themselves. As demonstrated below, this evidence can be pieced together to 
characterize alternative intra-household non-cooperative bargaining rules that are 
different from the unitary model.  
 In terms of modelling, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) show that the household 
resource allocation reached under bargaining is a two-stage optimization process, in 
which individuals maximize their own utility after some previous resource allocation 
has taken place, achieving a Pareto-efficient equilibrium that guarantees a certain 
degree of utility beyond a minimum level or threat point.. In models of marriage 
formation and dissolution, threat points refer to consumption utility levels that if not 
satisfied lead members to dissolve the household. In such models, threat points are 
often specified as functions of ‘extra-household environmental parameters’ (McElroy, 
1990) such as institutional, demographic and legal factors.  Different characterisations 
of these unobservable threat points include the level of utility attained alternatively if 
household members  were divorced (McElroy and Horney, 1981), engaged in a non-
cooperative games with other members of the household (Lundberg and Pollak,  
1993), or lived in extreme poverty (Licona, 1997).2 
                                                 
2 Assuming that household members engage in a cooperative Nash game, McElroy and Horney (1981) 
approximate this threat point as the level of utility outside marriage, that is, the utility that each person 
would obtain in case of divorce. Other cooperative models, such as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993), 
assume that household members bargain cooperatively but if cooperation does not take them to an 
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 Unfortunately, there is not a widely accepted proxy for the threat point (see 
Bergstrom, 1997) and in some cases divorce-based threat points are not adequate 
(Doss, 1996). In the case of Chile, divorce was unlawful at the time of the collection 
of data used in this study in 1996. Instead, Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) notion of 
socially established gender roles dominating or influencing decisions at the household 
is maintained in our model. Household members are believed to be part of gender-
based spheres within the household. Bargaining can be such that these two spheres 
relate or, instead, remain separated at the time of resource allocation, giving rise to the 
male dominant or machismo allocation rules (as explained below).  
We use the income necessary to purchase a basket of goods and services 
satisfying basic needs (i.e., the extreme poverty line) as a proxy for each individual 
threat point. Using the poverty line as a proxy for the threat point is particularly 
appealing for a distributive analysis as it  incorporates poverty directly in the 
household decision-making process.4  Also, it conveniently restricts the extra-
household factors considered to affect threat points to only those determining the cost 
of the food basket. In a model of marriage dynamics, this simplification would 
overlook important interactions. However, in an analysis of poverty, it allows to 
isolate the effects strictly caused by gender discrimination among household members 
and not by other factor exogenous to the household such as wage discrimination, for 
instance. Also, the estimated effects refer only to immediate or first-round effects, 
before further adjustments in behaviour or threat points do take place within the 
household.  
                                                                                                                                            
equilibrium, socially prescribed gender roles will do. In this ‘separate sphere model’ (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993: 990), the non-cooperative outcome resulting from gender roles is the threat point. 
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  The initial unitary household model is extended into a collective model 
equivalent to a problem where each household member maximizes his or her utility 
after their specific individual weights (the so-called sharing rule, Chiappori, 1992) are 
assigned.5 See appendix 1. Under the bargaining mechanism, factorial incomes 
initially generated by each individual add up to individual transferred incomes to 
generate a distribution of individual incomes, oiy :  
 
K
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o
i SSNwHy +++=                                                                                   [1] 
 
These incomes are transformed into his or her final income Riy  after some bargaining 
allocation rule, iθ , redistributes initial incomes. The resulting final income of each 
individual then becomes:    
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where ii wH refers to individual labour incomes from the main occupation;  iN , 
individual primary incomes other than labour, that is, financial incomes, rents, home 
production and pensions; ciS , social cash transfers received by the individual; kiS ,      
social in-kind transfers received by the individual;  and iθ , the vector of individual 
income shares resulting from the redistribution within the household. 
                                                                                                                                            
4 The resulting model – shown in Appendix 1 -- follows the tradition of quasi-homothetic preference 
models of household allocation using the basic food basket as minimum level of individual 
consumption. See Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974).  
5 When the sharing rule provides each household member’s exact needs, then the intra-household 
allocation becomes unitary. In other words, the unitary rule can be interpreted as a special case of 
bargaining behaviour.   
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 It is worth noting that the non-assignability property of in-kind transfers 
(Chiappori, 1992) ensures that in the final income equation [2], in-kind transfers 
initially received by each individual are not subject to further re-allocation within the 
household. For example, another household member cannot capture the monetary-
equivalent benefit implicit in the provision of free public education of a child. The 
same does not hold for a cash benefit transferred to a wife, which is susceptible to 
being appropriated by her husband, for instance. 
 
3. Machismo Bargaining Specifications 
To achieve a full model of bargaining, we need to unravel how the sharing rule, iθ , is 
assigned, that is, whether or not household members act cooperatively. In specifying 
the allocation rule existing evidence on intra-household behaviour becomes relevant, 
although it may be sometimes inconclusive and contradictory. Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (2003), for instance, report that increases in the ratio of wives’ to husbands’ 
assets (an indicator of women’s power within the household) have a positive effect on 
the household expenditure share on children’s health in Indonesia but negative in 
Bangladesh. Instead, in Ethiopia, the only significant impact that the wife’s position 
has is on the food and tobacco and alcohol shares, while in South Africa her position 
only affects the household expenditure share on education.  
 Existing evidence shows at least two forms of bargaining behaviour 
suggesting gender discrimination. A first form of bargaining is described as a 
machismo allocation. Under this allocation, individuals act non-cooperatively by first 
retaining the income necessary to satisfy their threat point, and excess income is then 
shared according to the needs of each individual of the same gender. In this model, 
there are no inter-gender transfers within the household: the sharing rule among 
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females is separated from the sharing rule among males. The sharing vector miθ  for 
males captures the individual share of each male with respect to the needs of all males 
in the household; similarly, the female sharing vector, fiθ , captures each female’s 
needs with respect to the total needs of females in the household.  In-kind transfers do 
not play a role in this intra-household redistribution. See Annex 1 for the 
formalization of this non-cooperative bargaining specification.   
 Rubalcava and Contreras (2000) for Chile, Thomas (1994) for Brazil, Ghana 
and the US, and Klasen (1998) for Germany, show that mothers and fathers allocate 
resources differently among daughters and sons. Comparing separately the nutritional 
status of sons and daughters or the expenditure shares on different items, these studies 
suggest that the gender of the household head has a significantly positive effect on a 
child of the same gender. Mothers channel relatively more resources into daughters, 
and fathers into sons, although mothers typically channel more resources to both boys 
and girls than fathers do. However, the evidence is not conclusive: Haddad and 
Hoddinott (1990) in Cote d’Ivoire and Thomas et al. (1997) in Indonesia, also report 
mothers showing preferences for boys. Of course, evidence on parental gender 
preferences has not been reported in practice as extreme as in this stylized allocation 
rule.  Nevertheless, as a simulation exercise, the extreme allocation rule allows us to 
estimate the potential consequences of a severe form of discrimination.  
 A second allocation rule presents a more realistic allocation. It also describes a 
non-cooperative intra-household behaviour. In this allocation, which we call a male 
dominant allocation, males and females first retain sufficient income to satisfy their 
basic needs at the threat point. Then, males contribute only a part of their excess 
incomes, while females contribute the totality of any excess income that they 
generate.  As in the machismo allocation, in-kind transfers are not redistributed within 
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the household. Also, household members do not engage in intra-household 
redistribution unless initial incomes exceed the individual’s threat point. See Annex 1. 
 Contreras and Cáceres (1999) report evidence of this sort of discrimination 
against females among Chilean households. This is reflected in the different shares of 
education expenditures according to gender of the child (especially among poor 
households). Anthropological studies also suggest a form of male dominance. In 
particular, males are reported to retain substantial proportions of their generated 
incomes, while women’s earned incomes are fully pooled for the household 
redistributive process. In India, Blumberg (1988) reports that males retain about 30% 
of their generated incomes in Kerala, and 26% in Tamil Nadu; for the same states, 
females retain 10% and 2% respectively. Roldán (1987) reports male retention shares 
of about 25% of their generated incomes in Mexico City, while Gideon (1999) reports 
male retention shares of 37% in rural areas, and 32% in urban areas of Honduras. In 
these cases, too, females are reported not to retain a significant share of their incomes. 
Other studies suggest the existence of differentials in contribution shares  by gender 
but do not report the magnitude of such differentials (for example, Blumberg, 1988, 
for Cameron and Ghana). In the light of this evidence, an average retention rate of 
25% is assumed for males while no retention is assumed among female household 
members. 
 
<Table 1: Bargaining Allocation Rules vs. Unitary Rule> 
  
4. The Measurement of Poverty Incidence and Income Inequality under the 
Simulated Bargaining Allocation Rules  
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This section discusses the consequences for poverty incidence and income inequality 
arising from intra-household allocation if alternative non-cooperative bargaining 
specifications were assumed to govern Chilean household behaviour in 1996 (see 
Annex 2 for a description of the data used). The impact of a specific allocation is 
estimated by comparing the poverty incidence and income distribution indicators 
among successive household income distributions. The baseline distribution refers to 
the standard unitary case where poverty indicators are estimated along a distribution 
of per capita household incomes. Alternative distributions result from applying the 
intra-household allocation of incomes according to the simulated rules in Table 1.  
Prior to these comparisons, however, a number of corrections regarding the original 
distribution of incomes obtained from the Chilean CASEN household survey 
(Mideplan, 1996) are in order. First, incomes are netted out of income taxes according 
to statutory tax rules and the prediction of non-filling taxpayers estimated for Chile by 
Engel et al. (1999). Second, in-kind transfers are imputed into the monetary 
distribution of household incomes according to statutory benefits and identified 
beneficiaries in the household following Cuesta (2005). Third, income poverty and 
distribution measures are both computed using successively alternative equivalence 
scales so as to separate the effects attributable to household composition from those 
caused by intra-household bargaining. Specifically, the Amsterdam Scale of Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) adjusts household needs according to physiological needs 
differentials, while the widely used Rothbarth Scale for Chile (World Bank, 1997) 
takes into account the efficiency gains associated with the size and age composition of 
the household.  
 The empirical estimates reported in Table 2 show that both equivalence scales 
and social transfers have sizeable effects on the measurement of poverty incidence, 
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using the official poverty lines set by Chile’s Ministry of Development and Planning 
(Mideplan, 1999). This is to be expected both from the substantial reductions in 
household needs from the equivalence scales6 and the size of transfers. Poorer 
households are typically bigger in size, have more children, and receive larger social 
transfers than non-poor households. As expected, poverty incidence measurements 
using the Amsterdam scale are slightly lower (by 0.8%) than the extreme poverty 
incidence of the per capita monetary case, and an additional 6% lower for moderate 
poverty (see rows “Amsterdam” and “ Per capita monetary”, respectively, in Table 2). 
Differences with the per capita distribution, however, are much larger using the 
Rothbarth scale: 1.2% lower for extreme poverty and 9% for moderate poverty (see 
rows “Rothbarth” and “Per capita monetary” in Table 2).  
 The comparison between the per capita monetary distribution and the per 
capita distribution of both monetary incomes and in-kind transfers tells us the extent 
to which the above differences are attributable to the inclusion of in-kind transfers vis-
à-vis the use of equivalence scales. The inclusion of in-kind transfers appears to 
reduce extreme poverty incidence by 4%, with roughly the same reduction observed 
for moderate poverty.  This result suggests that the non-assignability of in-kind 
transfers has significant consequences for the reduction of poverty, both at extreme 
and moderate levels, and even if no further intra-household allocation empowers 
particular members. This result contradicts Larrañaga (1999)’s finding — using only 
monetary transfers along — that social transfers are able to substantially reduce the 
ranks of the extreme poor but are unable to take them away from moderate poverty.   
                                                 
6  As an illustration, the Amsterdam Scale would reduce the total needs of a two-adult household with 
two children by 25% of the needs estimated on per capita basis. The reduction would rise to 40% in the 
case of the Rothbarth scale for a Chilean household of that composition.  
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 As for the distributive effect of bargaining rules, poverty incidence under both 
the machismo and male dominant rules shows unambiguous increases compared with 
the unitary model. Predictably, such increases in poverty incidence are wide in range:  
the difference between the unitary and male dominant rules amounts to 20%, most of 
which is concentrated on the incidence of extreme poverty. This sizeable increase of 
extreme poverty under the male dominant rule indicates that incomes retained by 
males are decisive for the satisfaction of needs among household members who 
cannot meet their basic needs on their own.7  
 The increase in poverty incidence caused by a male dominant rule is similar to 
that of the machismo allocation. Table 2 shows that the differences in poverty 
incidence between the machismo and unitary rules are slightly lower than 20% for 
total poverty. Again, this difference is accounted for by the increase in extreme 
poverty. The separate income distributions by gender (see rows ‘Female Distribution’ 
and ‘Male Distribution’ in Table 2), indicate that machismo allocations take their toll 
not only among females but also among males. The increase in female poverty is 3% 
higher than male poverty, suggesting that the contribution of females to household 
incomes is relevant. Underlying this result is the continued upward trend in female 
participation in the labour market since the mid-1980s and the (slight) reduction in 
male labour participation rates for the same period (Mizala and Romaguera, 2001). 
 As with poverty, the income distribution under intra-household bargaining 
allocation rules is markedly worse than under the unitary case (see Table 2). The 
deterioration of inequality indexes under the machismo and male dominant allocation 
rules is again similar in magnitude, although it is the machismo rule that brings the 
                                                 
 
7 This result is not caused by the selection of 25% as the retention rate of male transferable incomes 
(see above).  Similar incidences of poverty were obtained using retention rates of 20% to 35% of male 
transferable incomes.  
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largest deterioration vis-à-vis the unitary rule. Its Atkinson index amounts to 0.86, 
exceeding the 0.61 and 0.80 dispersion coefficients of income distributions under the 
unitary and male dominant rules, respectively. This result also holds for the Gini and 
the Theil inequality indexes, which suggests that the deterioration of income 
distribution is robust to the use of indicators sensitive to different regions of that 
distribution (Atkinson, 1970). Nonetheless, the increase of almost 40% of the 
estimated Atkinson index from the unitary to machismo rules is the largest among the 
estimated increases of the remaining indexes. This suggests that, also in terms of 
inequality, those at the bottom of the household distribution bear the brunt of the 
redistributive consequences of interpersonal gender discrimination within the 
household.   
 
< Table 2: Estimated Poverty and Income Dispersion Indicators under 
Alternative Allocation Rules >  
 
5. Conclusions 
Standard measures of monetary poverty and inequality along per capita household 
income distributions have assumed a unitary model governing intra-household 
allocation. The increasing evidence against the unitary model raises questions over the 
role of the additional redistributive round that takes place once factor incomes and 
State transfers reach the household. Estimates for Chile show that both poverty 
incidence and income inequality may change substantially when gender-based non-
cooperative bargaining governs relations among household members. Estimates show 
that  ‘mild’ forms of bargaining would typically bring redistributive results close to 
those observed under the non-discriminatory unitary allocation. However, taking 
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account of severe forms of gender discrimination would result in substantial increases 
in household poverty and inequality in Chile. Machismo allocation rules would affect 
more dramatically the final incomes of both males and females and, most importantly, 
already extremely poor households would bear the brunt.  
 Although these results should not be interpreted literally as real-life impacts, 
they point to potentially large consequences of extreme discriminatory practices 
within the household. Further research needs to factor in second-round distributive 
effects resulting from reactions of discriminated household members, alternative 
threat points with extra-household determinants, and also needs to go beyond the 
monetary metric. Our estimated effects, however, call for more attention to 
discriminatory practices within the household instead of focussing exclusively on 
extra-household discrimination at the labour market, in the provision of public 
services or in politics.       
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Table 1: Bargaining Allocation Rules vs. Unitary Rule 
Allocation 
Rule Individual incomes pooled together? 
 Factor incomes Cash transfers In-kind transfers 
Gender 
discrimination in the 
re-allocation of 
resources within the 
household? 
Unitary Yes Yes  Yes No 
Machismo 
Bargaining  
Yes, but only 
exceeding individual 
threat points 
Yes, but only 
exceeding 
individual threat 
points 
No 
Yes: redistribution of 
excess incomes only to 
same sex individuals 
Male dominant 
Bargaining 
Yes, but only 75% of 
income exceeding 
individual threat points 
for males, and 100% of 
excess incomes for 
females 
Yes, but only 75% 
of income 
exceeding 
individual threat 
points for males, 
and 100% of 
excess incomes for 
females  
No No 
Source: Author 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated Poverty and Income Dispersion Indicators under Alternative 
Allocation Rules 
 Poverty Incidence Income Dispersion 
 Extreme Total Atkinson Index 
Gini 
Index 
Theil 
Index 
Unitary:      
(a) Per capita household distribution of 
primary incomes and cash transfers 6.7% 24.9% 0.68880 0.51880 0.54775 
(b) Per capita household distribution of 
primary incomes, cash transfers and in-
kind transfers. 
2.3% 16.0% 0.61908 0.47615 0.46720 
Male Dominant 22.5% 37.6% 0.80969 0.60334 0.78263 
Machismo 22.4% 34.0% 0.86344 0.58612 0.73108 
      
Scaled Unitary Rules:       
(a) Amsterdam scaled household 
distribution of primary incomes, cash 
transfers and in-kind transfers 
1.5% 9.2% --- --- --- 
(b) Rothbarth scaled household 
distribution of primary incomes, cash 
transfers and in-kind transfers 
1.1% 5.6% --- --- --- 
Machismo Separated Distributions      
(a) Machismo, female distribution 23.5% 35.4% --- --- --- 
(b) Machismo, male distribution 21.4% 32.4% --- --- --- 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from CASEN household survey (Mideplan, 1996)..  
Note: Poverty incidence estimated according to the official poverty lines for 1996 (as in Mideplan, 
1999). The extreme poverty lines is set as the per capita daily cost of the basic food basket, officially 
set at US$0.53 and US$0.69 in rural and urban areas, respectively. A 75% additional increase of the 
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basic food basket in rural areas and 100% in urban areas set the total poverty lines, resulting in 
US$0.93 and US$1.38 in rural and urban areas, respectively. Moderate poverty incidence is the 
difference between total and extreme poverty.  
 
 
APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM WITH INTRA-
HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING 
 
After the classical maximization problem in the unitary household model is expanded 
to include the sharing rule, the intra-household bargaining problem becomes a two-
stage problem in which individuals maximize their own utility after some previous 
resource allocation has taken place (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999):  
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where C represents individual consumption;  L, the leisure composite; H , work effort 
(measured in working hours); χ,  the minimum level of consumption (whose 
equivalent income value can be thought as the extreme poverty line); λ,  the minimum 
level of leisure;  w,  wage or unitary labor income; Yo  is the initial full income;  YR  is 
the final full income after the intra-household re-allocation takes place;  T, the 
maximum time available; N, the non-labor primary income; Sc , cash social transfers; 
and  Sk , in-kind social transfers on education, health, housing subsidies.  
 As a special case of unitary household model (where the sharing rule 
assigns resources to their members based on their exact needs), the predicted incomes 
of household members after the two stages of the unitary model can be expressed as 
follows. In order to track the intra-household transfers, net receivers of transfers 
(typically, children or the elder) are separated from net contributors to the household 
(such as income earners): 
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Table A1.1: The Unitary Household Model 
Source: Author 
Notes: iχ  indicates the minimum equivalent income to purchase the official basket of goods in Chile.  
       M is the number of members of the household. 
 
 
The predicted final income distributions under non-cooperative gender discrimination 
rules are:   
 
Table A1.2: The Machismo Bargaining Model  
 
Household Net Generators Household Net Recipients
First Stage a) Intrahousehold 
Redistribution
for g = male, female
b) No intrahousehold
Redistribution
Second Stage a) Intrahousehold 
redistribution 
for g = male, female
b) No Intrahousehold
Redistribution
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Source: Author 
Notes: iχ  indicates the minimum equivalent income to purchase the official basket of goods in Chile.  
      M is the number of members of the household. 
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Table A1.3:  The Male Dominant Bargaining Model 
 
 Source: Author 
 Notes:  iχ  indicates the minimum equivalent income to purchase the official basket of goods in Chile. M is the number of members of the household.  YU  
refers to  the final full income after the male dominant rule acts within the household.  
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APPENDIX 2: Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
The 1996 CASEN household survey was designed, collected, and computed by the 
Ministry of Development and Planning, in collaboration with the University of Chile 
and ECLAC. The CASEN survey collects a nation-wide stratified random sample of 
households. The sampling method in 1996 includes all cities larger than 40,000 
inhabitants and, subsequently, randomly selects urban and rural towns, villages and 
settlements according to conglomerates as defined by the National Institute of 
Statistics’ Census. The 1996 CASEN survey collects 134,202 individual observations 
comprised in 33,636 households. Table A2 presents key descriptive statistics.   
 
Table A2: The 1996 CASEN Descriptive Statistics 
 Female Male 
 Head Non-head Head Non-head 
Individual characteristics     
Proportion (%) 10.8 89.2 39.8 60.2 
Schooling years 8.3 7.6 9.8 6.4 
Age 54.5 26.9 45.1 17 
Marriage Rate (%) 13.5 42.6 90.7 8.5 
Location in urban areas (%) 89.3 84.5 83.4 82.8 
Location in Santiago (%) 44.1 40.9 39.3 39.1 
Household characteristics      
Size 3.9 4.2 
Number of children 0.8 1.3 
Number of children aged 0-11 0.6 1.0 
Number of elder 0.4 0.1 
Number of servants 0.1 0.1 
Number of non-participant females  0.9 0.4 
Labour characteristics     
Participation (%) 45.8 33.3 82.0 43.2 
Weekly working hours 41.7 41.8 46.6 44.2 
Incomes (1986US$)     
Individual incomes      
Principal occupation, net of taxes 106.5 59.0 285.8 80.8 
Labour incomes other than labour 18.6 18.0 22.5 14.5 
Cash transfers 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Education in-kind transfers 0.02 5.1 0.01 8.2 
Health in-kind transfers 2.2 1.6 0.9 1.2 
Other household members’ incomes     
Principal occupation, net of taxes 208.6 444.1 171.6 430.6 
Primary incomes other than labour 3.0 4.6 3.7 5.1 
Cash transfers 14.3 21.1 20.3 20.6 
Education in-kind transfers 3.1 5.1 4.5 5.6 
All household incomes     
All primary 474.3 502.6 
All monetary 499.9 527.7 
All monetary and in-kind  526.1 553.1 
Source: Author’s estimates from 1996 CASEN household survey (MIDEPLAN, 1996).  
Notes: Incomes expressed in monthly 1986 US$. Primary incomes other than labour refer to pensions, 
financial incomes, rents and self-consumption.  
